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Abstract
We analyze the competitive capacity investment timing decisions of both established …rms
and start-ups entering new markets which are characterized by a high degree of demand uncertainty. Firms may invest in capacity early (when the market is highly uncertain) or late (when
market uncertainty has been resolved), possibly at di¤erent costs. In our model, established
…rms choose investment timing and capacity level to maximize expected pro…ts. Start-ups are
prone to bankruptcy if pro…t turns out to be too low, and hence choose investment timing and
capacity level to maximize the probability of survival. Surprisingly, we …nd that in monopoly
situations, a start-up is more likely to prefer early investment than an established …rm, despite
the presence of demand uncertainty. In duopoly situations with one start-up and one established …rm competing in the same market, we characterize the equilibria of a strategic capacity
investment timing game in which …rms choose when to build capacity. We …nd that when
demand uncertainty is high and costs do not decline too severely over time, the unique equilibrium of this game is for the start-up to take a leadership role and invest …rst in capacity while
the established …rm follows; by contrast, when two established …rms compete in an otherwise
identical game, high demand uncertainty leads to both …rms investing late. Thus, the threat of
bankruptcy leads to an increase in sequential investment outcomes in which the start-up leads,
a result that we demonstrate persists even if the start-up is concerned with both pro…t and
bankruptcy risk or pro…t above the bankruptcy threshold. We conclude that the threat of …rm
failure signi…cantly impacts the dynamics of competition involving start-ups.
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Introduction

Firms entering new markets face numerous operational challenges. Among the most crucial are
issues related to capacity investment.

Particularly when the size of a market is uncertain, two

A previous version of this paper was titled “Capacity Investment by Competitive Start-ups.” The authors thank
the Mack Center for Technological Innovation at the Wharton School for support of this project, and the Department
Editor, Associate Editor, and three anonymous referees for many helpful comments.
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common yet di¢ cult decisions are how much capacity to invest in, and when to do it. When choosing how much capacity to build or reserve with a supplier, the trade-o¤ is clear: too much capacity
results in underutilized facilities (if output is reduced to match market demand) or depressed prices
(if output remains high despite low demand), while too little capacity results in reduced sales and
suboptimal pro…t and growth.
Timing the capacity investment decision presents even subtler considerations.

Uncertainty

surrounding market size typically reduces over time, meaning a …rm that invests in capacity early
is subject to a higher degree of demand uncertainty than a …rm that postpones the investment
decision.

On the other hand, in competitive situations, a …rm investing earlier than its rivals

becomes the …rst-mover in the market, which may yield a strategic advantage. Indeed, the cost
of capacity itself may change over time, either increasing (e.g., if contract capacity becomes scarce
as the market matures) or decreasing (e.g., if learning enables lower-cost processes). These factors
combine to make the decision of when to invest in capacity just as di¢ cult and perilous, if not more
so, as the decision of how much capacity to build or purchase.
The timing of capacity investment when entering new markets is precisely the issue that we
consider. We …rst examine stylized monopoly models in which the sole entrant to a new market
must build or source capacity in anticipation of future demand. Eventual market size is uncertain,
and the …rm is allowed to invest in one of two periods: if the …rm invests early, then it makes
the capacity decision before knowing market size, whereas if it invests late, all demand uncertainty
is eliminated and capacity is built or sourced after learning market size. The cost of capacity is
allowed to vary between periods. Thus, a monopolist …rm must trade o¤ the value of information
(which is gained if the investment decision is delayed) with potential cost advantages from early
investment.
Because new markets are often pursued by nascent …rms, we focus on how the timing of capacity
investment di¤ers between start-ups and established …rms.

We consider the primary di¤erence

between these two types of …rms to be the threat of bankruptcy or …rm failure. Large established
…rms diversifying into new markets are unlikely to face imminent peril should demand in that market
turn out to be low; start-ups, on the other hand, are typically smaller …rms wholly invested in a
single market, and thus, to a far greater extent than their established counterparts, face potentially
disastrous consequences should the market fail to materialize as expected. The presence of this risk,
2

combined with the high degree of demand uncertainty that typically accompanies the development
of a new market, implies that start-ups should have a utility function which takes into account
the risk and consequences of failure. Hence, in our model, the objective of a start-up is to time
the capacity investment decision to maximize the probability of survival.

Established …rms, by

contrast, do not face an imminent risk of failure, and hence make capacity decisions to maximize
expected pro…t.
In the monopoly setting, we examine how start-ups di¤er in their capacity timing decisions from
established …rms, characterizing how market uncertainty, capacity costs, and the threat of failure
in‡uence both capacity levels and investment timing.

We …nd that established …rms are likely

to prefer late investment even if early investment is cheaper, because the ‡exibility to respond to
market conditions engendered by late investment allows the …rm to capture higher pro…ts, particularly in high demand states. By contrast, start-ups prefer to invest in capacity whenever capacity
is least expensive–that is, if capacity costs increase over time, start-ups prefer early investment–
because lower capacity costs minimize the threshold market size that results in …rm survival and
hence maximize the probability of survival.
We then proceed to analyze duopoly models in which two …rms simultaneously consider entry
into a new market.

In addition to all of the trade-o¤s inherent in the monopoly model, the

competitive interaction introduces a strategic aspect to the capacity investment timing decision:
a …rm investing earlier than a competitor may gain a leadership position in a sequential game.
We …nd that when a start-up competes with an established …rm, if market uncertainty is high
(as in a new market) and costs do not decline severely over time, then the unique equilibrium is
for the start-up to invest early, while the established …rm invests late.

By contrast, when two

established …rms compete, the only equilibrium when demand uncertainty is high is simultaneous:
both …rms invest late. We thus conclude that the threat of failure experienced by a start-up tends
to push capacity investment earlier–in both monopolistic and competitive situations–and leads to
asymmetric investment timing equilibria in which start-up …rms, remarkably, act as …rst-movers
in new markets, despite the apparent advantages of established …rms in terms of resources and
technology.
In this regard, our …ndings relate to several streams of research, for example the literature on
disruptive innovation. The seminal works on this topic are Bower and Christensen (1995), Chris3

tensen and Bower (1996), and Christensen (1997); Schmidt and Druehl (2008) provide a recent
review.

A disruptive innovation is an improvement in a product or service that fundamentally

changes its cost, performance, or target market in new or unexpected ways.1 Such innovations are
typically enabled by scienti…c, technological, or process advancements; for example, the rise of inexpensive, physically compact desktop computers enabled the emergence of the personal computing
market over the minicomputer and mainframe markets, and the development of cheap, tiny digital
‡ash storage technologies helped contribute to the dominance of digital photography over …lm photography. A recurring question in this literature is: why do large, established …rms typically fail
to embrace disruptive innovations early, while smaller start-up …rms often take a leadership role
in bringing the innovations to market? Our model supports one possible answer to this question,
namely, that it is the natural equilibrium of an endogenous timing game between a start-up and
an established …rm.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. §2 provides a brief review of the literature.
§3 analyzes the monopoly model, while §§4–5 analyze the duopoly model. §6 presents several
extensions to the basic model, and §7 concludes the paper.

2

Related Literature

There are three primary streams of research related to our work: the operations literature on capacity investment under uncertainty; the economics literature on competitive capacity investment;
and the strategic management literature on new market entry and disruptive innovation.

The

latter topic was discussed in §1; here, we brie‡y review the remaining two broad areas, with further
references to relevant works included throughout the remainder of the paper.
Our model is one of capacity investment with stochastic demand.

As such, it is related to

the extensive operations literature on this topic–see the comprehensive review by Van Mieghem
(2003). A number of papers consider the value of delaying capacity investment in order to obtain
more accurate demand information–see, e.g., the literature on postponement, such as Van Mieghem
1

We abstract from the details of innovation and focus on the outcome of innovation resulting in highly uncertain
new markets; thus, while we use the term “disruptive” as it invokes an image of signi…cant market upheaval and
uncertainty, innovation in our context could in fact be any of the four types of technological change described by
Lange et al. (2009)–sustaining, disruptive, architectual, and competence destroying discontinuities–so long as the
result is uncertainty in the size of the resultant market.
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and Dada (1999), Anand and Girotra (2007), and Anupindi and Jiang (2008), though these works
di¤er from ours in that they do not consider the possibility of …rm bankruptcy and the implications
it may have on the timing incentives of a start-up …rm.

Some works of particular relevance in

this stream include Archibald et al. (2002), Babich et al. (2007), Babich (2008), Swinney and
Netessine (2009), and Boyabatli and Toktay (2007), all of which consider the impact of bankruptcy
risk on capacity or inventory decisions.

Tanrisever et al. (2008) consider the related issue of

simultaneous investment into capacity and process improvement in the presence of bankruptcy.
While these papers address various consequences of bankruptcy on operational decisions (including
process development, capacity levels, …nancial subsidies to suppliers, and contracting and sourcing
strategies), no paper in the literature, to our knowledge, considers the impact of bankruptcy or …rm
failure on capacity investment timing. Indeed, there is a relative lack of research in the operations
literature on the topic of capacity investment timing for entry into new markets.
We analyze duopoly models consisting of two …rms strategically investing in capacity before
either begins to sell in the market. Similar models, frequently referred to as “endogenous leadership
games”in the economics literature, have been studied by Gal-Or (1985), Saloner (1987), Hamilton
and Slutsky (1990), Maggi (1996), and Bhaskaran and Ramachandran (2007).

Maggi (1996)

considers an endogenous leadership game with demand uncertainty, much like ours, although two
key di¤erences are that the di¤ering objectives of start-ups (and hence the impact of bankruptcy)
are not considered, and further capacity investment may occur in multiple periods (whereas in our
model, capacity investment occurs in at most one period, due to, e.g., high …xed costs).

Also

related along these lines is the long stream of research on capacity investment for entry deterrence,
pioneered by Spence (1977).
Lastly, there is an extensive literature on entry timing for reasons not related to strategic
capacity investment. Some examples include social in‡uence (Joshi et al. 2009), quality or cost
improvements (Lilien and Yoon 1990), product technology (Bayus and Agarwal 2007), and product
design (Klastorin and Tsai 2004). Our paper di¤ers from these by focusing solely on the impact of
bankruptcy risk on capacity investment timing under demand uncertainty, and exploring how such
risk impacts timing in duopolistic settings.

5

3

Monopolistic Firms

In this section, we introduce and analyze two di¤erent monopoly models of capacity investment
timing in a new market with uncertain demand: §3.1 discusses an established, pro…t-maximizing
…rm, while §3.2 considers a start-up prone to bankruptcy. The established …rm model is a relatively
standard formulation, and serves as a vehicle to introduce the dynamics of our setting and also as a
baseline for comparison with the bankruptcy-prone start-up. We defer all discussion of competition
until §4.

3.1

A Monopolistic Established Firm

An established …rm (denoted by the subscript e) sells a single product.2
product released to the market is Qe .
p (Qe ) = A

The quantity of the

The market price is given by the linear demand curve

Qe . Prior to determining the production quantity, the …rm must invest in production

capacity Ke which determines its maximum output.

This capacity may be internal to the …rm

(e.g., if the …rm in question is a manufacturer) or external (e.g., if the …rm outsources production
to a contract manufacturer). There is no constraint on the total amount of capacity that can be
built or reserved in either case.
Capacity investment may occur at one of two times: either early or late.

Early investment

is su¢ ciently far in advance of the selling season that the total market size is uncertain.

The

uncertainty in market size is re‡ected in the demand intercept, A, which is modeled as a continuous
random variable with positive support, distribution function F , mean , and variance

2.

Late investment, on the other hand, is su¢ ciently close to the start of the selling season that all
uncertainty in A is eliminated–hence, capacity investment is made after observing the realized value
of A. Demand uncertainty may be reduced or eliminated via a variety of mechanisms. For example,
uncertainty may be resolved exogenously if demand depends highly on overall market or economic
conditions at the time of product release, or if demand is a function of overriding consumer trends
in the category.

The …rm may take actions to resolve demand uncertainty, such as performing

extensive market research, employing consumer focus groups, or working with retailers to improve
2
We implicitly assume that the established …rm–diversifying into the new market–has already evaluated the
impact (if any) that market entry will have on sales of its existing products, and determined that entry is pro…table;
Druehl and Schmidt (2008) analyze this related problem of how new market entry can encroach on sales of existing
(substitutable) products.
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forecasts.

Lastly, the …rm may even produce some (economically insigni…cant) number of units

(e.g., using outsourced capacity) to sell in test markets, postponing full capacity investment until
a later date.
Regardless of when the …rm chooses the capacity, the production quantity (Qe ) is determined
after A has been observed and Ke has been …xed (i.e., just before the selling season), and hence
output is subject to the constraint Qe

Ke . We assume that capacity investment, whenever it is

made, is irreversible. Furthermore, capacity investment can occur in at most one period.3

The

total capacity cost is linear in the amount of capacity reserved, and the marginal cost of capacity
may vary over time.

The unit cost in the early period is denoted c1 and the unit cost in the

late period is denoted c2 . We make no ex-ante assumption on the ordering of c1 and c2 . Costs
that decrease over time (i.e., c1 > c2 ) may be re‡ective of exogenous technological or process cost
improvements, innovation, or raw materials cost decreases; similarly, costs that increase over time
(c1 < c2 ) could occur if contract manufacturers o¤er a discount for early investment, if capacity
in the later period is scarce, or if second period capacity must be installed more quickly, incurring
expedited construction or con…guration costs. The reasons behind inter-temporal cost variation are
outside the scope of this paper; rather, we will present results that hold conditional on a particular
cost trend.
The marginal production cost is zero, and for analytical tractability, we assume that the …rm
adheres to a production clearance strategy: that is, the …rm always produces up to its capacity and
releases the maximum quantity to the market, Qe = Ke . (The issue of holdback, i.e., producing
a quantity less than the total capacity, is discussed in §6.3.) The established …rm, being a large,
diversi…ed company, faces minimal risk of bankruptcy as a result of entry into this new market–
hence, facing uncertainty in market size (A), the established …rm seeks to maximize expected pro…t,
which is denoted E (

e (Ke )),

where the absence of the expectation operator,

e (Ke ),

is used to

denote pro…t for a particular realization of A. Throughout the analysis, optimal values (capacities,
pro…ts, etc.) are denoted by the superscript .
3

In reality, …rms may be able to invest in capacity in multiple periods. Allowing such an option clearly does not
impact the evaluation of deferred (late) investment, though it may increase the value of early investment. If …xed
costs of capacity installation or expansion are high, then the value of an option to invest in both periods is relatively
low–in the extreme case, if …xed costs are high enough, then …rms will only invest in capacity in one period. This is
the case that we consider.
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Given this formulation, the …rm’s optimal expected pro…t from early capacity investment is

E(

e)

= max E ((A
Ke 0

Ke

c1 ) Ke ) ;

(1)

while the …rm’s optimal expected pro…t from late capacity investment is

E(

e)

= E max ((A
Ke 0

Ke

c2 ) Ke ) :

(2)

Thus, when the …rm is deciding whether or not to invest in capacity in the early period, it must
compare (1) with (2). The following theorem provides the details of the optimal capacity timing
and investment level.
Theorem 1 A monopolist established …rm prefers early investment if and only if
2

yielding optimal capacity Ke = (

<(

c1 )2

(

c2 )2 ;

c1 )=2 and expected pro…t E (

(3)

e)

the …rm prefers late investment, yielding optimal capacity Ke = (A
E(

e)

=(

c2 )2 =4 +

=(

c1 )2 =4.

Otherwise,

c2 )=2 and expected pro…t

2 =4.

Proof. All proofs appear in the appendix.
As Theorem 1 demonstrates, an established monopolist prefers early investment if and only if
equation (3) holds, i.e., if demand uncertainty is low and early investment is cheaper than late
investment (c1 < c2 ).

Note that if capacity costs decrease over time (c1 > c2 ), the …rm prefers

late investment for any feasible variance (i.e., for any

2

0).

If capacity costs increase over

time (c1 < c2 ), the …rm may prefer early or late investment, depending on the level of demand
uncertainty.

3.2

A Monopolistic Start-up

A common feature of new markets, particularly those enabled by ground-breaking or unforeseen
technological innovation, is that they are characterized, ex ante, by a large amount of demand
uncertainty.

Thus, far more so than their established counterparts, smaller start-up …rms are
8

exposed to a serious risk: the risk of bankruptcy or …rm failure, should demand turn out to be low.
Consequently, while it is quite natural to assume that established …rms make decisions to maximize
expected pro…ts, it is less clear that start-ups should or do behave in the same way: as Radner and
Shepp (1996) and Dutta and Radner (1999) demonstrate, a …rm prone to bankruptcy that purely
maximizes expected pro…t over an in…nite horizon will fail with probability one.

The objective

of a start-up should, then, take into account the acute risk of failure associated with entry into a
new market. This implies that …rms particularly prone to bankruptcy–for our purposes, start-ups
entering new markets–in fact have a utility function that depends both on operating pro…t and the
risk of failure, e.g.,

Total Utility = Operating Pro…t

Cost of Bankruptcy

Probability of Bankruptcy,

(4)

where the “cost of bankruptcy” represents either real costs (e.g., default penalties on loans), or a
virtual penalty term embodying the expected consequences of bankruptcy.4

This type of utility

function can be found, for example, in the seminal paper by Greenwald and Stiglitz (1990) and in
Brander and Lewis (1988) and Walls and Dyer (1996).

If the probability of default due to the

outcome of this particular market is very low, then the …rm may safely ignore the last term and
simply maximize expected operating pro…ts; this would be the case with large, established …rms
considering diversifying entry into a new market that represents a small potential fraction of their
total business. Our model in the preceding section addressed precisely this scenario.
Alternatively, if the cost of bankruptcy is large compared to the assets of the …rm and would
result in …nancial ruin, or if the probability of bankruptcy is high (either of which is likely to be the
case for a start-up), the second term dominates the expression; the maximization problem may then
be thought of as approximately equal to minimizing the probability of bankruptcy or, equivalently,
maximizing the probability of survival. As a result, in what follows, we assume that the presence
of failure risk implies that start-ups have a di¤erent objective than established …rms: instead of
maximizing expected pro…ts, they maximize their chance of survival. Essentially, while any …rm
has a true pro…t function that accounts for both operating pro…ts and the chance of bankruptcy as
4

From the accounting and …nancial points of view, the meaning of the word “bankruptcy”is often complex and does
not necessarily imply that the company fails; the actual event of bankruptcy can have varying degrees of consequence
to a …rm, ranging from reorganization (Chapter 11 bankruptcy) to total liquidation (Chapter 7 bankruptcy). When
using this term we simply imply that the company becomes insolvent and ceases to exist due to the negative cash-‡ow.
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depicted in (4), we examine extreme cases: established …rms are entirely concerned with operating
pro…ts while start-ups are entirely concerned with the probability of bankruptcy.

As Chod and

Lyandres (2008) discuss, the owners of private …rms (e.g., start-ups in our model) are typically less
diversi…ed than the owners of public …rms (established …rms in our model), and hence are more
sensitive to the risk inherent in a single venture and the corresponding chance of failure. Thus, it’s
reasonable that start-ups and established …rms have di¤erent objectives–see Chod and Lyandres
(2008) and references therein for a detailed discussion of this matter.

This dichotomization of

the objective function, while stylized, allows us to obtain sharp results; we extend our analysis
numerically to the case of other, more complicated, objective functions in §6.4.
Consequently, the details of the model are identical to those introduced in §3.1, except for the
objective function of the …rm.

We use the subscript s to denote a start-up …rm.

The start-up

seeks to time its capacity investment and set the precise capacity level in order to maximize the
probability of survival, denoted

s (Ks ).

We assume that survival occurs for the start-up if, at the

end of the selling season, total revenues are greater than debt, where debt is de…ned to be the sum
of two components: …xed, capacity-independent debt

, and variable, capacity-dependent debt,

which is linear in the installed capacity.
The …xed component of debt, , is an exogenous parameter which may represent, for example,
loans taken to fund initial start-up expenses, overhead, market research, or R&D costs.

This

aspect of the start-up’s debt is pre-existing and …xed at the start of our model, and the terms of
the loan are structured such that

must be repaid after the start-up begins generating revenues.

In other words, the start-up raises capital in multiple rounds; early rounds fund R&D and start-up
expenses while late rounds fund capacity investment. We analyze the stage of the game after the
early rounds but before the later rounds, i.e., after the start-up’s initial capital structure, R&D
expenses, etc. have been …xed, similar to the second stage of the two-stage capital structure and
capacity games analyzed in Brander and Lewis (1986) and Brander and Lewis (1988).
The variable component of debt, linear in the capacity level, is only raised at the time that
capacity is installed. Regardless of when the capacity investment is made (early or late) the terms
of the loan state that repayment occurs after the start-up has generated revenues, i.e., at the end of
the selling season. Consequently, the start-up must generate enough operating revenue during the
selling season to pay both components of its debt; otherwise, it will fail. In other words, survival
10

Figure 1. The sequence of events in the monopolistic start-up model.

occurs if
Operating Revenue

+ Capacity Costs,

or, equivalently, if operating pro…t (revenues minus capacity costs) is greater than the …xed debt
. The sequence of events is summarized in Figure 1.5
In what follows, we assume that the start-up’s capacity costs are identical to the established
…rm analyzed in the preceding section (c1 and c2 for early and late investment, respectively), with
the understanding that, in general, the cost of capacity may be di¤erent for a start-up, particularly
if the cost of capital di¤ers from an established …rm. §6.2 explores a generalization of our model
with heterogeneous capacity costs.
The optimal survival probability from early investment is thus

s

= max Pr ((A
Ks 0

Ks

c1 ) Ks

);

(5)

while the optimal survival probability from late investment is

s

= Pr max ((A
Ks 0

Ks

c2 ) Ks )

:

(6)

Note that, in equation (6), we have assumed that a start-up investing late, no longer subject to
5

In reality, …nancing costs (and hence the cost of …nanced capacity and the probability of bankruptcy) would be
determined in a creditor-…rm equilibrium and may be a function of existing debt ( ), the amount of installed capacity
(K), and the default risk of the …rm. Moreover, we have not addressed the case when some capacity is funded using
internal equity and some capacity is paid for by …nancing. We make a simplifying assumption that …nancing costs
are exogenous and all capacity is paid for by …nancing to obtain insights into the competitive timing game; however,
analysis of the full equilibrium with internal equity and endogenous …nancing costs may prove to be an interesting
direction for future work.
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any uncertainty in demand, chooses a capacity level to maximize pro…t; at this stage, the start-up
does not maximize the probability of survival because the lack of uncertainty makes this quantity
ill-de…ned. However, by maximizing pro…t after observing market size under late investment, the
start-up survives in the largest number of demand states of any possible alternative strategy, and
hence this strategy is optimal in terms of maximizing the ex-ante survival probability. (Also, we
observe that it’s possible for A to be su¢ ciently low that survival is impossible.

In this case,

the start-up still enters the market and invests in the pro…t maximizing capacity despite the fact
that it is doomed to failure. Because the start-up is already accountable for the initial debt,
it cannot avoid bankruptcy by investing in zero capacity.

,

But building the pro…t maximizing

capacity ensures that the start-up’s lenders can be repaid to the greatest extent possible–as might
be the case, e.g., if the start-up enters bankruptcy and its assets are managed to repay as much
debt as possible before liquidation.)
The following theorem describes the optimal investment timing and capacity decisions, given
equations (5) and (6).
Theorem 2 A monopolist start-up prefers early investment if and only if c1 < c2 , yielding optimal
p
p
and survival probability s = 1 F (2
+ c1 ). Otherwise, the …rm prefers
capacity Ks =
late investment, yielding optimal capacity Ks = (A
p
F (2
+ c2 ).

c2 )=2 and survival probability

s

= 1

Theorem 2 demonstrates that a start-up prefers early investment only if costs increase over time
(c1 < c2 ). If costs decrease over time, the start-up prefers late investment. While the latter result
is identical to the established …rm case, the former is not; Theorem 1 shows that the established
…rm can prefer late investment even if costs increase over time, so long as demand uncertainty is
large enough. Thus, we conclude from Theorems 1 and 2 that, given any particular set of problem
parameters, a monopolistic start-up is more likely to prefer early investment than an established
…rm.
It is somewhat counterintuitive that a start-up, prone to such serious consequences should
failure occur, is more willing to invest in capacity early than an established …rm (given that the
two …rms have equal capacity costs); moreover, the start-up’s decision is curiously una¤ected by
the degree of demand uncertainty. The reason for the latter result is that the start-up maximizes
12

the probability of survival by maximizing the range of demand outcomes in which it survives.
To accomplish this, it chooses the capacity that leads to survival at the lowest possible demand
threshold–with this capacity level, the …rm will survive for all higher demand realizations. This
threshold demand level is independent of the demand variance, hence variance does not impact the
start-up’s survival-maximizing capacity decision.
In addition, because the start-up chooses the capacity level which ensures survival over the
largest range of demand outcomes, the ability to respond to demand via late investment is not
valuable to the start-up; late investment does not change the minimum demand level which ensures
survival, and hence does not increase the start-up’s survival probability. What does impact survival
probability is capacity cost: lower capacity costs lead to a lower survival threshold and hence a
greater survival probability. Consequently, as Theorem 2 shows, when capacity costs change over
time, the survival probability will be greater in the lower cost period, which leads to the result that
the start-up prefers to invest in the period with the lowest cost.
Lastly, we observe that the expression for the optimal capacity level under early investment,
p
, can lead to seemingly counterintuitive behavior. The fact that the optimal capacity
Ks =
is independent of both demand uncertainty and cost is a consequence of our stylized objective
function; a more complicated (and realistic) objective function that incorporates both pro…t and
bankruptcy risk will, in general, yield optimal capacities dependent on , demand uncertainty, and
capacity costs.
Qualitatively, however, the insights generated by these stylized results are compelling.
instance, if

For

is very small the optimal capacity is also very small, suggesting the start-up is

very risk-averse for a small bankruptcy threshold; if

is very high, the optimal capacity is also

large, suggesting the start-up is very risk-seeking when the chance of bankruptcy is high. But a
start-up maximizing the probability of survival is neither risk-averse nor risk-seeking: it is averse
p
is entirely consistent with a notion of avoiding
to bankruptcy. The optimal capacity Ks =
bankruptcy: if

is small, bankruptcy can only occur if demand is very low relative to capacity,

hence the optimal action (to minimize the chance of bankruptcy) is to set a very small capacity;
similarly, if

is very large, survival can only occur if demand is high and the …rm can capitalize

on this, so the optimal action is to set a high capacity and “hope for the best.” Thus, a start-up
at high risk of bankruptcy (high

) can act in a seemingly aggressive manner, while a start-up
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with a low risk of bankruptcy (low

) has far greater incentive to be conservative in its capacity

investment; this type of behavior will play a key role in determining the outcome of competition in
the following sections.

4

Duopoly Model

We now move to the duopoly model.

The details of the model are identical to the monopoly

model addressed in the previous section, except there are now two …rms competing with perfectly
substitutable products in the new market.

One …rm is a start-up (denoted s) and maximizes

the probability of survival, while the other is an established …rm (denoted e) that maximizes
expected pro…t.

The quantity of the product released to the market by …rm i is Qi , i 2 fs; eg.

The market price of the product is given by the linear demand curve p (Qi ; Qj ) = A

Qi

As before, A is a random variable with positive support, distribution function F , mean
variance

2.

Qj .
, and

Firms have identical capacity costs, which, as in the monopoly case, may vary over

time (heterogeneous costs are discussed in §6.2). Note that we implicitly assume that neither …rm
is an incumbent in the market, thus a typical nomenclature in the disruptive innovation literature–
entrant vs. incumbent …rms–does not exactly apply to our model. It might be natural, though,
to assume that the established …rm is an incumbent in a related market or industry.

Examples

of this scenario include: Amazon.com and Barnes & Noble, both of whom entered the online book
space at roughly the same time, despite the fact that Barnes & Noble was an “incumbent” in the
related market of brick-and-mortar book retailing; and Webvan, a start-up which competed with
existing traditional grocery stores in the emergent online grocery market in the early 2000s.
Before the early period (e.g., during an even earlier “decision period”), the …rms simultaneously
make their capacity timing decision. Each …rm has two possible actions: either commit to invest
in the early period, or commit to delay until the late period. We assume that these actions are
credible and irreversible. This initial game is referred to as the investment timing game, or merely
the timing game. There are four possible pure-strategy outcomes to the timing game: both …rms
invest early, both …rms defer until the late period, and the two asymmetric outcomes in which one
…rm invests early and one …rm invests late. The timing game, and the abbreviations used to refer
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Start-up Early
Start-up Late

Established Firm Early
(E; E)
(L; E)

Established Firm Late
(E; L)
(L; L)

Table 1. The four possible sequences of moves and their abbreviations.

Figure 2. The sequence of events in the duopoly model.

to its outcomes, are depicted in Table 1.6
The capacity subgame then unfolds according to the sequence of moves determined by the timing
game. In the late period, we assume all actions from the early period are publicly observable (e.g.,
if the established …rm invests in the early period and the start-up defers, the start-up observes the
precise capacity level of the established …rm at the beginning of the late period before choosing
its own capacity level). Thus, in addition to the informational and cost considerations from the
monopoly model, there are strategic factors in play with the timing of capacity investment: if one
…rm moves early and the other moves late, the early-moving …rm enjoys a leadership position in
a sequential game while the late-moving …rm is a sequential follower. As before, we assume that
capacity investment is irreversible, and …rms may invest in capacity in at most one period. The
sequence of events is depicted in Figure 2.
In the following four lemmas, we analyze the equilibria to each of the four capacity subgames
6

We note that while we consider a …rst stage investment timing game with embedded capacity subgames for its
analytical convenience, this game is equivalent to a game in which …rms do not …rst decide on an investment time,
but rather simultaneously decide whether and how much to invest in the early period (i.e., whether to “invest now
or wait”), under one key condition: if a …rm unilaterally deviates from a particular equilibrium investment sequence,
its competitor is allowed to optimally adjust capacity (but not investment timing) in response to this deviation. We
believe this is a plausible scenario in reality, as capacity investment is a lengthy process and hence a …rm sensing its
competitor will deviate from a timing sequence (e.g., that the competitor will move from early to late investment)
seems likely to modify its capacity level in the midst of the investment/construction process.
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depicted in Table 1. Once we have derived these equilibria, we may in turn analyze the equilibrium
to the investment timing game.
We …rst consider the case in which both …rms invest in capacity late, i.e., after observing A.
Because there is no randomness, as in the monopoly model, the start-up will choose capacity to
maximize pro…t. The following lemma describes the equilibrium capacity investments for each …rm
in this game, in addition to providing the ex-ante survival probability of the start-up (
ex-ante expected pro…t of the established …rm (E (

s)

and the

e )).

Lemma 1 If both …rms invest in capacity late, then equilibrium capacities are Ke = Ks =

A c2
3 .

The ex-ante equilibrium expected pro…t of the established …rm is
2

E(

e) =

c2 )2

+(
9

;

(7)

while the ex-ante equilibrium survival probability of the start-up is

=1

s

F 3

p

+ c2 :

(8)

We now move to the game in which the established …rm invests late while the start-up invests in
capacity early, i.e., prior to observing A. The following lemma describes the equilibrium capacity
levels, expected pro…t, and survival probability.
Lemma 2 If the start-up invests early while the established …rm invests late, equilibrium capacities
p
p
are Ke = A 22 c2 and Ks = 2 . The ex-ante equilibrium expected pro…t of the established
…rm is
2

E(

e)

=

+

c2
4

p

2

2

;

(9)

while the ex-ante equilibrium survival probability of the start-up is

s

=1

p
F 2 2 + 2c1

c2 :

(10)

We next consider the case in which both …rms invest in capacity early, i.e., before observing the
value of A. Lemma 3 describes the equilibrium.
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Lemma 3 If both …rms invest early, equilibrium capacities are Ke =

p
2

c1

and Ks =

p

.

The ex-ante equilibrium expected pro…t of the established …rm is

E(

e)

1
4

=

c1

p

2

;

(11)

while the ex-ante equilibrium survival probability of the start-up is

=1

s

p

p
2
+

F

+ c1

:

2

(12)

Lastly, we address the case in which the start-up invests in capacity late while the established
…rm invests in capacity early. The following lemma describes the resulting equilibrium.
Lemma 4 If the established …rm invests early while the start-up invests late, equilibrium capacities are Ke =

2c1 +c2
2

and Ks =

2A

+2c1 3c2
.
4

E(

e) =

The ex-ante equilibrium expected pro…t of the

established …rm is
( + c2 2c1 )2
;
8

(13)

while the ex-ante equilibrium survival probability of the start-up is

s

5

=1

F

2

p

+

2c1 + 3c2
2

:

(14)

Equilibrium to the Timing Game

Having derived equilibria to each of the capacity investment subgames, we may now derive the
equilibrium to the investment timing game.

The following theorem describes all of the possible

equilibria to this game:
Theorem 3 Let

c

c1

c2 , let

c1

1

p

2

c2

p

2

2

(15)

and let
2

9
( + c2
8

2c1 )2
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(

c2 )2 :

(16)

Then the following pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing game exist:
1. If

2

2. If

2

<

and

1

>

1

and

c<

1p
3

c <

, then both …rms invest early.

p
3 2 2p
2

, then the start-up invests early while the established …rm

invests late.
3. If

2

>

4. If

2

<

2

2

and
and

c>

p
3 2 2p
2

c>

1p
3

, then both …rms invest late.

, then the start-up invests late while the established …rm invests

early.
There are several interesting consequences of these results. First, we note that the equilibrium
regions are not exhaustive in covering the parameter space, nor are they mutually exclusive. As
a result, regions of no (pure strategy) equilibria can occur, as can regions of multiple equilibria
(in particular, regions in which late investment by both …rms and early investment by both …rms
are both possible equilibria). In all, there are six potential equilibrium regions to the investment
timing game: one region each for (L; L), (E; L), (L; E), and (E; E); one region in which (E; E) and
(L; L) are both possible; and one region in which no equilibrium exists. It may also be the case
that the regions of (L; E) equilibrium existence, non-existence and multiple equilibria are empty,
depending on the parameter values.
To help understand the behavior described in Theorem 3, it is useful to graphically compare
possible equilibrium outcomes to the monopoly case.

Figure 3 does this for a typical scenario.

First, note that Figure 3a shows the optimal investment timing for a monopolist as a function of
the variance of demand (vertical axis) and the cost di¤erential

c = c1 c2 : the solid line represents

the boundary between early and late investment for a pro…t maximizing …rm, while the dashed line
represents the boundary for a survival maximizing start-up.

As the …gure shows, the start-up

prefers early investment for a much larger portion of the parameter space.
Figure 3b depicts the timing equilibrium regions in the competitive model using the same
parameter values as Figure 3a. The …rst observation one can make is that in the competitive case,
early investment (for both …rms) is far more likely. Moreover, if demand uncertainty is su¢ ciently
high and costs do not decrease too much over time ( c is not too large and
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2

is not too small,

Figure 3. (a) Optimal investment timing for a monopolist. The solid line represents the boundary for an
established …rm and the dashed line for a start-up …rm. (b) Equilibria to the investment timing game
between a start-up and an established …rm. In both examples, c1 = 1, = 10, and = 20.

case (2) of the theorem), the unique equilibrium to the investment timing game is for the start-up
to invest early and the established …rm to invest late.
This equilibrium precisely describes the situation discussed by Bower and Christensen (1995):
a new market enabled by disruptive technology with highly uncertain demand, in which a start-up
plays the role of leader and the established …rm the role of follower. This occurs because of three
competing forces in the model.

The …rst is that early investment is valuable due to …rst-mover

advantage in a sequential capacity game (if the competitor invests late). The second is that late
investment is valuable due to the ability to exploit demand variance. The third is that the cheaper
investment period is valuable due to cost savings, which can impact the value of either period.
As we have already seen in the monopoly model, the second reason does not impact a start-up;
hence, if costs do not decline severely over time, the start-up prefers early investment due to the
leadership position in the capacity game.

(Note that, unlike the monopoly model, a start-up

facing competition from an established …rm may invest early in capacity even if late investment is
cheaper.)
By contrast, the established …rm does value late investment due to the ability to exploit demand
variance; hence, if variance is su¢ ciently high, the established …rm prefers late investment even
though it cedes a leadership position to the start-up. In particular, the start-up continues to choose
the minimum capacity level that ensures survival over the widest range of demand outcomes, and
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hence does not exploit its leadership position to greatly increase capacity as a pro…t-maximizing
…rm might; consequently, it would appear that the established …rm does not surrender as much by
following a start-up as it might by following another established …rm, a hypothesis that we verify
in §6.1 by analyzing a model of two competing established …rms.
We also observe that when costs decrease signi…cantly over time, the picture can become complicated. In particular, a unique equilibrium may exist (either both early or both late, or the start-up
following the established …rm), multiple equilibria may exist, or a pure strategy equilibrium may
fail to exist. In the region of non-existence (denoted by the null symbol in Figure 3b), the start-up
prefers to invest at the same time as the established …rm (i.e., the start-up would like to exploit
cost reduction and information but only if it does not mean giving up a leadership position), while
the established …rm prefers to invest at the opposite time of the start-up. As a result, the outcome
of the game is unclear in this region (although, it should be noted, the region of non-existence
typically covers a very small portion of the parameter space). Moreover, it is possible for an (L; E)
equilibrium to exist if

c is su¢ ciently large (or if

is su¢ ciently small) and demand uncertainty

is small–however, this equilibrium never exists for the parameter values used to generate Figure
3. Indeed, the equilibrium does not exist for most reasonable parameter values, since the decline
in capacity costs over time must be very large relative to the mean demand and the bankruptcy
threshold

–for example, if c1 = 1 and c2 = 0:8, representing a 20% cost reduction from period 1

to period 2, then for (L; E) to be an equilibrium it must be true that the bankruptcy threshold
< 0:77.

6
6.1

Extensions
Competition with Two Established Firms

In this section, we analyze an investment timing game identical to the one discussed in §5, with one
key di¤erence: rather than competition between a start-up and an established …rm, both …rms are
established, pro…t maximizing …rms. We assume, as before, that the …rms are ex-ante identical in
all other respects. This allows us to compare the outcomes of the timing game with heterogeneous
…rms to an otherwise identical game with two mature …rms, thus isolating the impact of bankruptcy
risk on capacity investment timing. The following theorem presents the equilibrium to the timing
20

game in this case.
Theorem 4 If two established …rms compete in an investment timing game, then there exists some
threshold

such that, for all

>

, the unique equilibrium of the investment timing game is for

both …rms to invest late.
As the preceding theorem demonstrates, a high degree of demand uncertainty leads to a unique
equilibrium outcome when established, pro…t-maximizing …rms compete: both …rms invest in capacity late. This is in stark contrast to the investment timing equilibrium when a start-up competes
with an established …rm: in that case, we observed that high demand uncertainty can lead to equilibrium outcomes in which the start-up acts as a sequential leader in the investment game.

We

note that, in the game with two established …rms, asymmetric outcomes can occur for lower demand variability; however, they can never occur if demand variability is su¢ ciently large, unlike the
model with one start-up and one established …rm. Hence, we conclude that a start-up’s propensity
to avoid bankruptcy can have a signi…cant e¤ect on the dynamics of competition, particularly when
demand uncertainty is high in the context of new markets.

6.2

Firms with Heterogeneous Capacity Costs

In this extension, we return to the base model (one start-up and one established …rm) and consider
the impact of heterogeneous capacity costs. For the sake of simplicity, we will assume that costs
are constant over time for both …rms, since we have already explored the impact of time-varying
costs. Let the cost of the established …rm be ce and the cost of the start-up be cs . Our analysis
of the asymmetric capacity games in fact already accommodates heterogeneous costs (since costs
in the base model varied over time, when …rms invest at di¤erent times, costs are by de…nition
heterogeneous).

Thus, we need only modify our analysis to account for heterogeneous costs in

the symmetric investment games. The following lemma summarizes the equilibria to the capacity
investment games:
Lemma 5 If …rms have heterogeneous capacity costs that are constant over time, then:
1. (L,L) If both …rms invest in capacity late, then equilibrium capacities are Ke =
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A+cs 2ce
3

and

Ks =

A+ce 2cs
.
3

The ex-ante equilibrium expected pro…t of the established …rm is
2

E(

e) =

9

+

+ cs
3

2

2ce

;

while the ex-ante equilibrium survival probability of the start-up is

s

p
F 3
+ 2cs

=1

ce :

2. (E,L) If the start-up invests early while the established …rm invests late, equilibrium capacities,
pro…ts, and survival probabilities are identical to those derived in Lemma 2, with ce = c2 and
cs = c1 .
3. (E,E) If both …rms invest early, equilibrium capacities are Ke =

p
2

ce

and Ks =

p

.

The ex-ante equilibrium expected pro…t of the established …rm is

E(

e)

=

1
4

ce

p

2

;

while the ex-ante equilibrium survival probability of the start-up is

s

=1

+3

F

p

+ 2cs
2

ce

:

4. (L,E) If the established …rm invests early while the start-up invests late, equilibrium capacities,
pro…ts, and survival probabilities are identical to those derived in Lemma 4, with ce = c1 and
cs = c2 .
Armed with the equilibrium survival probabilities and expected pro…ts, we may derive the
equilibrium to the capacity investment timing game:
Theorem 5 If …rms have heterogeneous capacity costs that are constant over time, a unique equilibrium to the timing game exists. Let

1

ce

p

2
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ce

p

2

2

and let
2

+ cs 2ce
p
:
2 2

Then the following pure strategy equilibria to the investment timing game exist:
1. If

2

>

1,

2. If

2

<

1

and

p

> ce

cs , both …rms invest early.

3. If

2

<

2

and

p

< ce

cs , the established …rm invests early while the start-up invests late.

the start-up invests early while the established …rm invests late.

Intriguingly, when costs are constant over time but di¤er between the two …rms, only one
equilibrium is possible when demand uncertainty is high: the start-up is the leader. This preserves
our main result–that bankruptcy risk leads to an increased frequency of equilibria in which start-ups
lead established …rms–and demonstrates that it is not sensitive to the homogenous cost assumption.

6.3

Holdback

Throughout our analysis, we have assumed that …rms always produce to their maximum capacity–
that is, both …rms follow a production clearance strategy. From a modeling perspective this allows
for a simple and relatively clean analysis of the capacity investment decision–in the absence of
this assumption, closed form solutions for equilibrium capacities, pro…ts, and survival probabilities
cannot be obtained–and moreover the clearance assumption may be thought of as the outcome of
selling the product at a series of di¤erent prices until capacity is exhausted or fully utilized, in
which case the “market price”is actually an average price. Additionally, …rms frequently produce
at maximum capacity because of high …xed costs of starting and stopping the production process
(e.g., in the chemical or semiconductor industries): see Goyal and Netessine (2007).
From a practical standpoint, though, it may be unwise for a …rm to always produce at maximum
capacity. Other papers (e.g., Chod and Rudi 2005) have demonstrated that a clearance assumption
typically has a negligible impact on analytical outcomes, however, it is useful to verify this result in
our setting. Hence, in this section, we discuss the impact of the alternative assumption: a holdback
strategy, in which the …rms may produce any ex-post pro…t maximizing quantity subject to their
individual capacity constraints.
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It is …rst useful to consider the qualitative impact of holdback. In fact, our previous analysis
accommodates a holdback strategy whenever a …rm invests late–this is because we assume that late
investment occurs after the resolution of demand uncertainty, hence the …rm would never invest in
more capacity than necessary for maximizing pro…t (i.e., a …rm investing in capacity late always
produces to full capacity). Thus, the analysis for any …rm investing late is unchanged if holdback is
allowed. Furthermore, the analysis of a start-up investing early is also unchanged by the option of
holdback. Recall that a start-up investing early chooses the minimum capacity level that supports
survival–in other words, if a start-up invests in Ks units of capacity, it must sell all Ks units to
survive. As a result, a start-up investing early will always produce up to its maximum capacity
level if it survives; holdback could only occur in demand states in which the start-up does not
survive, which does not impact the start-up’s subsequent probability of survival.
It follows, then, that holdback only a¤ects an established …rm investing early.

Intuitively,

granting such a …rm the option of producing less can only increase the value of early investment
relative to late investment.

Some incentive for late investment remains, though, particularly if

capacity costs are signi…cant relative to marginal production costs; in that case, there is still value
to waiting for the resolution of demand uncertainty to avoid sinking excess money into costly
capacity.

Hence, we postulate that allowing holdback increases the established …rm’s incentives

for early investment without completely eliminating incentives for late investment.
While this thought experiment helps to understand the impact of holdback on …rm pro…t, without further analysis, it’s unclear how holdback a¤ects the competing start-up’s survival probability
and the equilibrium of the timing game. To that end, we conducted a numerical study to explore
precisely this issue.

The model employed in the study is identical to the one analyzed in the

rest of the paper, save for the fact that …rms are allowed to engage in holdback. The additional
complication is that a quantity game occurs at the start of the selling season: after observing the
realized value of market size (A), …rms choose production quantities to maximize pro…t, subject to
their individual capacity constraints. (As in the base model, production is assumed to be costless,
though positive production costs do not qualitatively change any results).
To analyze this more complicated model, we must make an additional assumption concerning
the order of moves in the quantity game.

A variety of plausible options exist (e.g., the leader

in the capacity game is the leader in the quantity game; the established …rm is the leader in the
24

Parameter
Demand Distribution (A)

c1
c2

Values
Gamma
10
f2:5; 5; 7:5; 10; 12:5; 15; 17:5; 20g
1
f0:333; 0:667; 1; 1:333; 1:667g
f10; 20; 30; 40; 50g

Table 2. Parameter values used in numerical experiments.

quantity game due to greater market power; …rms strategically time their quantity decisions just
as they do their capacity decisions).

We choose the simplest sequence: simultaneous quantity

competition. Thus, the …rms engage in capacitated Cournot competition in the quantity game–see
Gabszewicz and Poddar (1997) for a proof of existence of an equilibrium in this subgame (as well
as an analysis of a similar ex-ante capacity investment game, but with two pro…t-maximizing …rms
moving simultaneously).
We examined 200 parameter instances consisting of every combination in Table 2, which were
selected to provide a wide range of possible scenarios (e.g., low to high demand variability, various
product margins, etc.). In each case, we calculated the equilibrium to the investment timing game
with holdback and with clearance. Comparing the incidence of speci…c equilibria between the two
possible assumptions allows us to determine the impact of holdback on our theoretical results.
Our results are summarized in the …rst two rows of Table 3. As expected, since the value of
early investment is higher with an option to produce less than capacity, early investment becomes
a more attractive option for the established …rm with holdback: the established …rm invests early
in only 10% of cases with clearance, but 63% of cases with holdback. Conversely, the impact on
the start-up’s equilibrium investment timing is far less: the start-up invests early in 79% of cases
with clearance and 86% of cases with holdback. Importantly, holdback never results in the reverse
sequential outcome (i.e., the established …rm leading and the start-up following). Moreover, even
with the possibility of holdback, (E; L) equilibria in which the start-up leads still occur in roughly
one quarter of our numerical examples (although at a more moderate frequency than under the
clearance assumption).
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6.4

Alternative Objective Functions

In the preceding analysis, we assumed that the start-up chooses a capacity level and investment
time to maximize its probability of survival. As we discussed in the introduction, if the probability
of survival is low or the consequences of failure are severe, it is safe to assume that a start-up pays
little attention to immediate pro…ts and focuses more on simply avoiding bankruptcy. However,
an interesting question is how the behavior of the start-up changes if it cares about both pro…t and
the probability of survival. Moreover, start-ups …nancing their activities may be subject to limited
liability should bankruptcy occur, which implies that while pro…t may be a factor in the objectives
of start-ups, it is only the pro…t above the bankruptcy threshold which truly matters (Jensen and
Meckling 1976, Brander and Lewis 1986).

To that end, in this section we numerically examine

the impact of two alternative objective functions for a start-up.

The …rst is referred to as the

integrated objective function, and is equal to the expected operating pro…t ( ) minus an exogenous
bankruptcy penalty (D) times the probability of bankruptcy (1

E(

s)

D

(1

)

s ):

(17)

As one might expect, since this objective is a linear combination of the previously analyzed survival
probability and pro…t objectives, the behavior of a …rm choosing capacity and investment time to
maximize (17) lies somewhere between that a purely pro…t and a purely survival focused …rm. In
particular, the …rm places more weight on the potential cost advantages of early investment (because
this lowers the chance of bankruptcy) and less weight on the variance-exploiting advantages of late
investment than a purely pro…t maximizing …rm. Consequently, depending on the precise value of
D (and hence the relative weight placed on each portion of the objective function), the equilibria to
the timing game resembles a mixture of the cases previously analyzed (with a survival maximizing
…rm, and with two pro…t-maximizing …rms).
The second alternative objective function is called the limited liability objective function.

In

this scenario, the start-up is assumed to lose all pro…t if bankruptcy occurs (e.g., any remaining
funds are distributed to debtholders) while keeping any excess pro…t above the survival threshold;
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consequently, the start-up only cares about expected pro…t in excess of the survival threshold, i.e.,

E(

s

j

s

)

s:

(18)

Unlike the integrated objective function, (18) is not a linear combination of the pro…t maximizing
and survival maximizing functions. As a result, how this objective function impacts the equilibrium
to the investment timing game is, at …rst, not obvious.
While neither of these functions permits the relatively clean analytical treatment of a survival
maximizing objective function, it is possible to analyze both using numerical methods.

Table 3

presents the results of applying the same large-scale numerical study from the previous section
(i.e., using the 200 parameter combinations depicted in Table 2) to models in which the start-up
optimizes a limited liability or integrated objective function. For the sake of comparison, the …rst
row of the table lists equilibrium incidence for our base model (a survival maximizing start-up) and
the last row lists results for a model with two pro…t maximizing …rms. As the table shows, both
the limited liability and integrated objective models yield results somewhere between the survival
maximizing and pro…t maximizing cases.
The table nicely demonstrates a key feature of our model: that bankruptcy tends to shift
equilibria toward the sequential outcome with the start-up as the leader.

The intuition behind

this result is clear in the case of the integrated objective function, as it is a linear combination
of expected pro…t and survival probability: later investment allows the …rm to exploit demand
variance, which increases the value of the pro…t portion of the objective function, while earlier
investment (particularly if it is less costly) allows the …rm to reduce the chance of bankruptcy and
hence reduce the impact of the bankruptcy penalty. Hence, depending on the value of the penalty
parameter (D), the frequency of equilibria occurrence is somewhere between that of the purely
pro…t maximizing and purely survival maximizing cases.
As the table demonstrates, similar to the integrated objective, the incidence of equilibria under
limited liability also lie somewhere between that of the base survival maximizing case and the pro…t
maximizing case. Compared to the pro…t maximizing case, fewer (L; L) equilibria and more (E; L)
equilibria occur; in other words, with limited liability, sequential outcomes (with the start-up as
leader) are more likely than sequential outcomes in competition between two pro…t maximizing
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Investment Sequence
(E; E) (E; L) (L; E) (L; L)

Model
Base Model

10%

69%

0%

24%

Base Model + Holdback

63%

23%

0%

18%

Limited Liability Startup

8%

29%

0%

66%

12%
12%
12%
12%

4:5%
11%
32%
56%

0%
0%
0%
0%

88%
81%
59%
35%

10%

2:5%

2:5%

90%

Integrated
Integrated
Integrated
Integrated

Objective
Objective
Objective
Objective

Start-up,
Start-up,
Start-up,
Start-up,

D
D
D
D

= 10
= 100
= 1000
= 10000

Two Pro…t Maximizing Firms

Table 3. Incidence of equilibria to the investment timing game under various models. Note that the total
percentages of equilibrium incidence may sum to more or less than 100, due to regions of potential
non-existence and multiple equilibria.

…rms.
These numerical tests show a shift toward sequential outcomes persists regardless of the precise
way in which bankruptcy risk is incorporated into the start-up’s objective function. With a purely
survival maximizing start-up, there is a very strong push towards sequential outcomes; with an
objective function concerned with the upside of potential pro…t (such as the integrated objective
or the limited liability objective) this e¤ect is tempered somewhat, but not entirely eliminated.
Consequently, we conclude that these results support our …ndings that the threat of bankruptcy–
manifested in the start-up’s objective function in a number of di¤erent ways–can lead to a greater
chance of sequential outcomes in which the start-up takes a leadership role.

7

Conclusion

In this work, our chief goal was to analyze how the threat of bankruptcy impacts the capacity
investment and timing decisions of …rms entering new markets. We …nd that in monopoly markets,
start-ups are more likely to prefer early capacity investment than pro…t-maximizing established
…rms.

In competitive markets, when demand uncertainty is large, the outcome of a strategic

investment timing game leads to an equilibrium in which the start-up invests early while the
established …rm invests late–starkly contrasting to a model with two established …rms, which leads
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to simultaneous late investment under high demand uncertainty.
We arrived at these results despite invoking several assumptions intended to minimize the
incidence of sequential equilibria. For example, in previous literature, one explanation o¤ered for
established …rms failing to seize opportunities in disruptive markets is that their demand forecasts
are too pessimistic or simply inaccurate.

We have found, on the contrary, that even if both

…rms have identical demand forecasts (i.e., identical beliefs about the distribution of market size),
sequential equilibria arise if a start-up is present.

If we incorporated pessimistic forecasts by

established …rms into our model, this would have the e¤ect of decreasing the expected market
size in the established …rm’s pro…t function, qualitatively preserving our results (and giving the
established …rm even more incentive to invest late). Similarly, we assumed that both …rms have
access to the technology that enables the new market at the start of the strategic investment game–
in other words, no …rm is playing catch-up from a technological standpoint, and both are capable
of capacity investment at any time.
In addition, because start-ups may face …nancial constraints that limit the maximum possible
expenditure on capacity, one might reasonably suppose that it is appropriate to incorporate such
a constraint into our formulation. Recall that the optimal capacity level of the start-up at either
investment time is the minimum capacity level at which survival can occur— if the start-up has
insu¢ cient funds to support this capacity, then survival can never occur, and hence the survival
probability is zero. Alternatively, if the start-up has more funds than necessary to support this
minimum capacity level, the constraint is not binding and hence is irrelevant. Thus, at least in
the survival maximizing case, such a constraint has a very “bang-bang” impact on the model: it
is either irrelevant or it reduces the survival probability to zero. A …nancial constraint is more
meaningful if the start-up considers some combination of pro…t and bankruptcy costs, e.g., as in
§6.4. In this case, any constraint will likely limit the value of late investment as it reduces the ability
of the start-up to react to high demand states with a high capacity level— consequently, though
we do not explicitly include any …nancial constraints in our model, we anticipate that they would
either have minimal impact on our results (in the case of survival probability maximization) or they
would favor early investment even more than our current model (in the case of more complicated
objective functions).
We also did not model a variety of other factors that may in‡uence capacity investment timing.
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For example, greater sales may be enabled by earlier entry (e.g., if late entry results in slower
time-to-market).
to invest early.

Directionally, the impact of this e¤ect is clear: it increases …rm incentives
While this would likely change the equilibrium thresholds given in Theorem 3,

the qualitative impact of the start-up’s survival maximizing objective function remains (as do
the consequences of acting as a …rst- or second-mover in the capacity game), implying that the
strategic investment game will have a similar structure and will yield similar results. Future work
may investigate the robustness of our results with regards to a number of similar complications,
including cost uncertainty, allowing …rms to add capacity in multiple stages rather than only once,
and the incorporation of the initial market entry and capital structure decisions that lead to the
determination of . In addition, it would be interesting to analyze the full creditor-…rm equilibrium,
in which the …nancing costs of the start-up are endogenously determined and dependent on existing
debt, the amount of installed capacity, the start-up’s default risk, and internal equity.
We conclude that capacity competition involving start-ups subject to bankruptcy risk–in a variety of forms–is fundamentally di¤erent in nature from the competition between established …rms,
and our model o¤ers a plausible explanation of some practically observed phenomena. Managerially, these results are important because they imply that the optimal strategic investment position
di¤ers depending on the nature of the competitor.

Thus, blindly following a mantra of seizing

the “…rst-mover advantage” can be a perilous strategy, as any such advantage (or disadvantage)
depends critically on the characteristics of the …rms in the market.
While our key …ndings relate to equilibrium capacity investment timing and investment, our
results also relate to the literature on disruptive innovation, which has frequently observed that
start-ups tend to pioneer new markets while established …rms postpone investment.

A variety

of reasons for this phenomenon are o¤ered: the established …rms are said to be too close to and
too trusting of their existing customers, who themselves are ill-equipped to articulate their own
changing needs, therefore causing a failure to anticipate opportunities within the existing customer
base; the established …rms fail to recognize and cultivate entirely new markets; internal incentives
at the established …rms favor the development and implementation of incremental improvement
over radical change.

All of these explanations imply that established …rms fail in some crucial

way that newer …rms do not. By controlling for these factors in our formulation, our results imply
that, while it is certainly possible that managerial failures and other reasons cited in the disruptive
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innovation literature can lead to established …rms detrimentally ceding a leadership role to startups in new markets, this need not be the case; the operational reality of capacity investment under
demand uncertainty, coupled with facing competition from start-ups prone to failure, o¤ers a purely
rational explanation for these outcomes.

A

Appendix: Proofs

Proof of Theorem 1. Early Investment: the pro…t function implied by (1) is concave and yields
a unique maximum at the Cournot monopoly point, Ke = (
c1 )=2. Expected pro…t is thus
E ( e) = (
c1 )2 =4.
Late Investment: the pro…t function implied by (2) is concave and yields a unique maximum at
the Cournot monopoly point, Ke = (A c2 )=2. Expected pro…t is thus E ( e ) = E (A c2 )2 =4 =
c2 )2 =4 + 2 =4.
Proof of Theorem 2. Early Investment: maximizing the survival probability function in (5)
is equivalent to

(

s

= max Pr A

Ks

Ks 0

+ Ks + c1

= max 1

F

Ks 0

Ks

+ Ks + c1

;

and, consequently, this is equivalent to minimizing Ks + Ks + c1 . This expression is convex and
p
yields a unique minimizing capacity of Ks =
. The corresponding optimal survival probability
p
is thus s = 1 F (2
+ c1 ).
Late Investment: under late investment, the start-up maximizes pro…t after observing A. This
implies the late investment capacity level is identical to the established …rm’s capacity level until
late investment, i.e., Ks = (A c2 )=2. The survival probability is thus
s

c2 )2

(A

= Pr

=1

4

F 2

p

+ c2 ;

yielding the result.
Proof of Lemma 1. Because there is no randomness if both …rms invest late, the capacity
investment game is a Cournot duopoly with heterogeneous costs. Thus, the pro…t of each …rm is
given by
e (Ke )

= (A

Ke

Ks

c2 ) Ke ;

s (Ks )

= (A

Ke

Ks

c2 ) Ks :

Both pro…t functions are concave, yielding unique best replies
Ke (Ks ) =

A

Ks
2

c2

and Ks (Ke ) =

A

Ke
2

c2

:

The equilibrium capacities are found by solving for the intersection of the best replies, which yields
the unique equilibrium Ke = Ks = A 3 c2 . Equilibrium pro…t of each …rm is
E(

e) = E (

s) = E

A

c2
3
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2

2

=

c2 )2

+(
9

:

Recall that the start-up survives if the total pro…t level is above : in other words, if ((A c2 ) =3)2
. Thus, the ex-ante survival probability (i.e., the probability of survival before learning market
size, taking into account the competitive outcome of the capacity game that occurs after learning
market size) is given by (8), while the (ex-ante) equilibrium expected pro…t of the established …rm
is given by (7).
Proof of Lemma 2. Recall that the best reply of the established …rm is Ke (Ks ) = A K2s c2
when both …rms invest late: this continues to hold when the start-up invests early and the established …rm invests late. The start-up’s pro…t is thus
s (Ks )

= (A Ke (Ks ) Ks c1 ) Ks
1
=
(A Ks 2c1 + c2 ) Ks :
2

The survival probability is the probability that
s (Ks )

= Pr
= 1

s (Ks )

, i.e.,

1
(A Ks 2c1 + c2 ) Ks
2
2
F
+ Ks + 2c1 c2 :
Ks

The maximizer of thepsurvival probability is the minimizer of the argument of F in the above
equation, i.e., Ks = 2 , yielding (10) when substituted into the expression for the start-up’s
survival probability. The established …rm’s pro…t is
e (Ke )

=

1
A
4

c2

p

2

2

;

and ex-ante expected pro…t is thus given by the expected value of this expression, yielding (9).
Proof of Lemma 3. Survival for the start-up occurs if A Ks + Ke + Ks + c1 , so the survival
probability is thus
s (Ks ; Ke )

=1

F

Ks

+ Ke + Ks + c1 :

Minimizing the the argument of F in the above expression is equivalent to maximizing the probap
bility of survival. Thus, the start-up’s optimal capacity investment is Ks =
, a dominant action
that is independent of the established …rm’s capacity level. The established …rm’s expected pro…t
is
E ( e (Ks ; Ke )) = (
Ke Ks c1 ) Ke :
Substituting the equilibrium Ks p
and maximizing this concave function of Ke yields the established
c1
…rm’s optimal capacity, Ke =
. The associated expected pro…t is (11), and the equilibrium
2
survival probability of the start-up is hence (12).
Proof of Lemma 4. The best reply of the start-up investing late is the same as in Lemma 1,
i.e., Ks (Ke ) = A K2e c2 . Hence, the established …rm’s expected pro…t from early investment is
E(

e (Ke ))

=

Ke
2

Ke

c2

c1 Ke

Maximizing this expression yields an optimal capacity level of Ke =
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2c1 +c2
2

for the established

…rm and hence

+ 2c1 3c2
4
for the start-up. The equilibrium expected pro…t of the established …rm is thus (13), and the
start-up’s equilibrium survival probability is (14).
Proof of Theorem 3. We will examine the viability of each subgame in Table 1 individually.
(i) (E; L). First, let us consider the equilibrium in which the start-up invests early and the
established …rm follows: (E; L). This is an equilibrium if no …rm has incentive to unilaterally
deviate: in other words, if the established …rm enjoys greater expected pro…t than in (E; E), and if
the start-up enjoys a greater survival probability than in (L; L). From Lemmas 1 and 2, comparing
the arguments of the distribution function F in each of the equilibrium survival probabilities, we see
that if the established …rm invests late, the start-up enjoys a (strictly) greater survival probability
by investing early if:
p
p
2 2 + 2c1 c2 < 3
+ c2 :
Ks =

2A

Rearranging this expression, we see it reduces to
p
p
2 2 <3
+ 2 (c2

c1 ) :

If c1 < c2 , the condition holds if > 0. If, on the other hand, c1 > c2 , the start-up may unilaterally
deviate from (E; L) for some > 0. Examining this expression, we see that the inequality is most
likely to hold if is large–hence, the start-up will deviate from (E; L) if costs decrease over time,
and is su¢ ciently small.
Next, consider the established …rm, which, from Lemmas 2 and 3, will not deviate from (E; L)
if
p
p 2
2
2+
c2
2
(
c1
)
>
:
4
4
This expression reduces to
2

>

c1

p

2

c2

p

2

2

:

(19)

In other words, the established …rm will not unilaterally deviate from (E; L) if demand is variable
enough, where the threshold variability is a function of the problem parameters. This demonstrates
case (1) in the theorem.
(ii) (E; E). We next consider the equilibrium in which both …rms build capacity early. From
Lemmas 2 and 3, the established …rm will not deviate from this equilibrium precisely if (19) is
violated. From Lemmas 3 and 4, the start-up will not deviate if
p
p
p
1
3
+ c1
+
c1 + c2 > 2
+
:
2
2
2
2
This inequality reduces to

1p
> c1 c2 :
3
This demonstrates case (2) in the theorem.
(iii) (L; L). We lastly consider the equilibrium with both …rms building capacity late. In this
case, part (i) of the proof demonstrated that the start-up prefers (L; L) to (E; L) if
p
p
2 2 >3
+ 2 (c2 c1 ) :
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Similarly, from Lemmas 1 and 4, the established …rm will not deviate from this equilibrium if
( + c2 2c1 )2
<
8

2

c2 )2

+(
9

This inequality reduces to
9
( + c2 2c1 )2 (
c2 )2 < 2 :
8
This proves case (3) of the theorem.
p
< c1
(iv) (L; E). The start-up has incentive to deviate from (E; E) to (L; E) if 13
the established …rm has incentive to deviate from (L; L) to (L; E) if
9
( + c2
8

2c1 )2

c2 )2 >

(

2

c2 , and

;

proving case (4) of the theorem.
Proof of Theorem 4. We must …rst analyze several additional aspects of the capacity
subgames in order to analyze the investment timing game. First, consider the game in which both
…rms invest early. This is a Cournot duopoly, hence the equilibrium pro…ts of the (symmetric)
established …rms are both
(
c1 )2
E ( e) =
:
9
Next, consider the game in which the …rms invest sequentially. This is identical to the previously
analyzed game in which the established …rm invests early and the start-up invests late (because, in
that case, the start-up maximized pro…t due to the elimination of uncertainty). Hence, the pro…t
of the leader is
( + c2 2c1 )2
E ( e) =
8
while the pro…t of the follower is
E(

e) =

4

2

3c2 )2

+ ( + 2c1
16

:

Finally, the game in which both …rms invest late yields identical pro…ts to both …rms equal to
2

E(

e)

=

c2 )2

+(
9

:

Thus, the investment timing game in normal form has payo¤s
Firm 2 Early
Firm 1 Early
Firm 1 Late

Firm 2 Late
( +c2 2c1 )2 4 2 +( +2c1 3c2 )2
;
8
16
2 +(
2 +(
c2 ) 2
c2 )2
;
9
9

c1 )2 ( c1 )2
; 9
9
4 2 +( +2c1 3c2 )2 ( +c2 2c1 )2
;
16
8
(

First, assume that …rm 2 invests early. Firm 1 prefers late investment if
4
Clearly, as

2

2

+ ( + 2c1
16

3c2 )2

>

c1 )2

(
9

:

(20)

increases, this inequality is more likely to hold. Similarly, if …rm 2 invests late, …rm

34

1 prefers late investment if
2

c2 )2

+(
9

>

( + c2 2c1 )2
:
8

(21)

Again, as 2 increases, this inequality is more likely to hold, thus for large enough 2 (i.e., 2
above some threshold), late investment is the dominant strategy of both …rms and (L; L) is the
only possible equilibrium, proving the theorem.
Proof of Lemma 5. Omitted–similar to Lemmas 1–4.
Proof of Theorem 5. Similar to the proof in the base model, we will examine each possible
equilibrium individually.
(i) (E; L). This is an equilibrium if no …rm has incentive to unilaterally deviate: from Lemma
5, the start-up will not deviate if
1
which always holds.
deviate, i.e., if

p
F 2 2 + 2cs

ce > 1

F 3

p

+ 2cs

ce ;

The equilibrium is supportable if the established …rm has no incentive to
2

+

p

ce
4

2

2

>

1
4

ce

p

2

;

p
p 2
2
which holds if 2 > (
ce
)
ce
2
–thus, with constant, heterogeneous costs,
2
(E; L) is an equilibrium if
is su¢ ciently large.
(ii) (E; E). This sequence is only an equilibrium if the established …rm has no incentive to
deviate, which the analysis of (E; L) showed occurs for low 2 . It must also be the case that the
start-up has no incentive to deviate, which holds if
p
p
1
3
+ 2cs ce
+3
1 F 2
+
ce + cs > 1 F
2
2
2
p
> ce cs .
which is equivalent to
p
(iii) (L; E). The start-up has incentive to remain in this equilibrium if
< ce cs . The
established …rm has incentive to remain in this equilibrium if
2

9

+

+ cs
3

This reduces to
<

2ce

2

<

( + cs 2ce )2
:
8

+ cs 2ce
p
:
2 2

(iv) (L; L). This sequence is only an equilibrium if the start-up has no incentive to deviate,
which the analysis of (E; L) showed is never true. Hence, (L; L) cannot be an equilibrium.
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